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Abstract 
This study re-examines the competing claims that PIN [Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara, 2002, Is 
information risk a determinant of asset returns? Journal of Finance 57, 2185-2221] is priced in 
the cross-section of stock returns while AdjPIN [Duarte and Young, 2009, Why is PIN priced? 
Journal of Financial Economics 91, 119-138], the component of PIN related to information 
asymmetry, is not. We find that behind these seemingly contradicting conclusions is the role of 
institutional investors, and the pricing of PIN and AdjPIN depends on institutional ownership. 
Only for those stocks with low institutional ownership are both PIN and AdjPIN priced. Our 
findings imply that investors require compensation for information risk only from stocks with 
low institutional ownership. 
 
JEL Classification Number: G3, G14, G32 
Keywords: Institutional Ownership; Informed Trading; Information Asymmetry; Abnormal 
Returns 
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1 Introduction  
This study examines the pricing of information asymmetry conditional on the equity 
ownership of institutional investors. Our study is motivated primarily by an influential set of 
papers by Easley, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996), Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002), 
and Easley and O’Hara (2004), all of whom argue that information risk in the form of an 
asymmetric information distribution among traders of a risky asset is priced. Their key measure 
of information asymmetry is the probability of informed trading (PIN) and a number of studies 
have documented empirical evidence supporting the positive relation between expected returns 
and PIN.1  
However, a small but growing empirical literature has casted doubt on whether PIN can 
capture information risk arising from information asymmetry.2 Of particular note is Duarte and 
Young (2009), who examines whether PIN is priced because of information asymmetry or 
because of liquidity effects that are unrelated to information asymmetry. By decomposing PIN 
into two components, one related to information asymmetry and the other to illiquidity, they 
show that while the component related to illiquidity is priced, the component related to 
information asymmetry, which they call the “adjusted PIN” (AdjPIN), is not priced. In response 
to Duarte and Young (2009) as well as other critiques, however, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara 
(2010) reconfirm that the PIN factor remains a significant determinant of stock returns even after 
                                                 
1 For example, Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002), Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2010), and Li, 
Wang, Wu and He (2009). 
2 Using a sample of mergers and acquisitions in Euronext Paris, Aktas, de Bodt, Declerck and Van 
Oppens (2007) find that the behavior of PIN is inconsistent with other evidence of information leakages 
during the pre-event period. Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009) find that the relation between PIN and stock 
returns is not significant when alternative model specifications and time periods are used. 
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controlling for the liquidity factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and the illiquidity factor of 
Amihud (2002). 
In this paper, we also examine the relation between expected return and PIN or AdjPIN to 
see whether information risk that arises from information asymmetry is priced. Our innovation is 
that we predict and find the relation between information asymmetry and expected returns 
conditional on the equity shareholdings of institutional investors. We find that PIN and AdjPIN 
are priced only among the stocks that have low institutional ownership levels; this pricing effect 
disappears in stocks with high levels of institutional ownership. Our findings suggest that the 
question at issue is not as much about whether PIN and AdjPIN adequately capture information 
risk that originates from information asymmetry, but more about under which circumstances 
information asymmetry matters to asset pricing. The market appears to be less concerned about 
compensation for information risk in the event of high institutional ownership levels, that is, 
investors require compensation for information risk only among the stocks with low levels of 
institutional ownership.      
Our focus on the roles of institutional investors in the pricing of information asymmetry 
is for at least two reasons. First, one potential role for large institutional investors to play is to 
provide a credible mechanism for transmitting information to the financial markets. 
Chidambaran and John (1998) find that large institutional investors convey private information 
obtained from management to other shareholders. Because institutional investors are likely to 
have informational superiority owning to the economy of scale in information acquisition and 
processing, as well as an easier access to and control of management, this suggests that the 
market may interpret the presence of an institutional shareholder in a firm as a credible signal 
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regarding the firm's performance and future prospects.3 Second, the presence of institutional 
investors in a firm may signal to the market that the severity of information asymmetry 
surrounding a firm is likely to be ameliorated by the monitoring activities of institutional 
investors. For instance, institutional investors can pressure a firm to disclose information in a 
timely manner,4 which make stock price more informative about its fundamental value. 
Alternatively, institutional investors can threaten to sell their holdings upon receiving negative 
information about a firm,5 which also causes stock price to reflect the firm’s fundamental value 
more accurately. Therefore, we argue that the pricing of information asymmetry as measured by 
PIN or AdjPIN should depend on the presence of institutional investors. Our results confirm this 
prediction and imply that uninformed investors perceive institutional ownership as a positive, 
credible signal for mitigating the adverse effects of asymmetric information; hence, they require 
compensation for information risk only from stocks with low institutional ownership levels, that 
is, the pricing of information asymmetry matters only for firms with low institutional ownership. 
Before addressing the central issue of the paper, we first examine and re-confirm the 
relation between institutional ownership and the PIN and AdjPIN measures.6 Specifically, we 
find a negative effect of institutional ownership on both PIN and AdjPIN, which holds under 
                                                 
3 For stock return information, see Gompers and Metrick (2001), Bennett, Sias and Stark (2003), Sias, Starks and 
Titman (2006), Yan and Zhang (2009), and Baik, Kang and Kim (2010). For corporate events, see Ke and Petroni 
(2004), Bushee and Goodman (2007), and Chiang, Qian and Sherman (2010). 
4 See, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Gillan and Starks (2000), Hartzell and Starks (2003), Ferreira and 
Matos (2008), and Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira and Matos (2011). 
5 See, for example, Admati and Pfleiderer (2009), Edmans (2009), and Edmans and Manso (2011). 
6 There is limited empirical evidence on the relationship between information asymmetry and institutional 
shareholdings. Dennis and Weston (2001) finds that institutional ownership is negatively associated with PIN, but 
their study is restricted to a short period of 1997–1998  period. By contrast, Brockman and Yan (2009) find that both 
inside and outside block ownership levels are positively associated with PIN. To the best of our knowledge, there is 
to date no study that examines the relationship between institutional ownership and AdjPIN. 
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different estimation methods and model specifications. The fact that we document such a 
relationship substantiates the role of institutional investors in a market setting under which 
information is asymmetrically distributed over all traders. We then examine the competing 
claims that PIN is priced (Easley et al., 1996; Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara, 2002; Easley and 
O’Hara, 2004, and Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara., 2010), but AdjPIN is not (Duarte and Young, 
2009). These claims are based on the use of different methodologies, which we closely follow 
but using our own sample data. In the portfolio approach, we extend the results of Easley, 
Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara. (2010), who focus solely on their PIN measure, and find that not only 
PIN but also AdjPIN are priced. The abnormal return of a large-PIN (large-AdjPIN) portfolio is 
significantly greater than that of a small-PIN (small-AdjPIN) portfolio; besides, the difference in 
abnormal returns between these two portfolios is statistically significant. On the other hand, in 
the Fama and Macbeth (1973) regressions we re-confirm the validity of Duarte and Young’s 
(2009) claim that only PIN and not AdjPIN is priced.  
To resolve these seemingly contradicting findings, we re-examine expected returns of our 
sample stocks in a setting where information asymmetry is most likely in evidence, together with 
a circumstance where information asymmetry is likely to exert the greatest effect on the expected 
returns. Given the significant monitoring role played by institutional investors, we introduce the 
level of institutional equity stock holdings of a firm into both the portfolio approach and the 
Fama and Macbeth (1973) regression framework. We find that both PIN and AdjPIN are priced 
only among those sample stocks that have low levels of institutional ownership; for stocks with 
high institutional ownership levels, the pricing effects of PIN and AdjPIN disappear. We make 
use of both the portfolio approach and the Fama-Macbeth regression framework to ensure that no 
fundamental difference originates from the choice of methodologies. In the portfolio approach, 
7 
 
we double-sort stocks by institutional ownership into quintile portfolios and then by PIN 
(AdjPIN) into tercile portfolios. We form five hedge portfolios with long positions in the large-
PIN (large-AdjPIN) tercile and short positions in the small-PIN (small-AdjPIN) tercile, and 
examine the abnormal returns of these hedge portfolios. We find that only the hedge portfolios 
with the lowest or second lowest levels of institutional ownership have a significantly positive 
abnormal return, while all the other hedge portfolios have insignificant alphas. These results still 
hold whether we use the 4-factor model of Carhart (1997) or whether we augment this model 
with the liquidity factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). In the Fama-Macbeth framework, we 
create three dummy variables to index the institutional ownership groups to which a stock 
belongs. Again we find that only for stocks in the low or medium group of institutional 
shareholdings are PIN and AdjPIN priced, whereas for stocks in the high institution ownership 
group, PIN and AdjPIN are not priced. Taken together, these results suggest that the pricing of 
information asymmetry is subject to institutional ownership levels.  
One study most closely related to ours is Armstrong, Core, Taylor and Verrecchia (2011), 
who examine when information asymmetry affects the cost of equity capital. Using the number 
of investors in a stock as a proxy for the level of competition for a firm’s shares, they find that 
although information asymmetry is positively associated with the firm’s cost of capital in excess 
of standard risk factors, this relationship holds only under imperfect market competition. Another 
closely related work is Akins, Ng, and Verdi (2011), who document similar results using the 
number and concentration of institutional investor ownership as proxies for competition among 
informed investors. This paper differs from these studies in that we focus on the governance role 
of institutional investors as large shareholders, while they concentrate on the degree of market 
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competition. Further, we focus on equity ownership of institutional investors and relate it to 
widely used proxies for information asymmetry, i.e., PIN and AdjPIN.  
Overall, our study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we document a 
negative relationship between  institutional ownership and PIN or AdjPIN measure for a large 
sample over a sufficiently long period. Second, we show that the contradictory results 
documented in prior literature depend on the methods of analysis that the authors have adopted. 
Third, we show that both PIN and AdjPIN are priced among only those stocks that have low 
institutional ownership levels, which suggests that institutional ownership is likely to affect the 
pricing of information asymmetry.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample data, 
variables and methodologies. Section 3 presents empirical results and analysis. Section 4 
concludes. 
 
2 Data, Variables, and Methodologies 
2.1 Data 
Our sample starts with all publicly traded firms on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) for the 1993–2004 period. This period 
overlaps largely with those in Duarte and Young (2009) and Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara 
(2010).7 We obtain stock return, stock price, shares outstanding, and firm age from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), insider transactions and institutional holdings from the 
Thomson Reuters ownership database, accounting data from COMPUSTAT, and analyst 
                                                 
7 This makes our analysis more relevant for the debate on the empirical controversy over the pricing effect of PIN 
and AdjPIN. Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009) find that the pricing effect of PIN is restricted to a particular period.  
9 
 
coverage from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S). To estimate PIN and AdjPIN, 
we obtain trades and quotes from the Trade and Automated Quote (TAQ) database. We exclude 
financial companies (SIC 6000–6999), utilities (SIC 4900–4999), American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs), Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), stocks of companies incorporated outside of the 
U.S., and closed-end funds. We also exclude stocks that have fewer than 60 days of quotes or 
trades in any sample year because it is impossible to estimate the PIN and AdjPIN models 
reliably for such stocks. Also excluded are trades and quotes that occur before and at the open, 
and at and after the close, quotes that have zero bid and/or ask prices, and trades that have zero 
prices. Finally, we eliminate observations with missing stock returns or accounting data. We 
winsorize all variables at the 1% and 99% tails to eliminate the effects of outliers. The final 
sample consists of 3,782 firms with 16,866 firm-year observations.  
 
2.2 Variables 
2.2.1 PIN and AdjPIN 
As the most widely used proxy for information asymmetry, PIN originates from the 
theoretical model of Easley et al. (1996). To date, a large body of research has adopted PIN as 
the principal measure to examine the pricing of information asymmetry.8 The PIN model of 
Easley et al. (1996) is based on the sequential trade models of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and 
Easley and O’Hara (1987) in which orders come from either informed traders who trade for 
speculative purposes based on private information, or uninformed (noise) traders whose reasons 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Easley and O’Hara (2004), Hughes, Liu, and Liu (2007), Easley et al. (2002), Hail and Leuz 
(2006), Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2010), Duarte, Han, Harford, and Young (2008), Duarte and Young (2009), 
Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007), Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo (2011), Aktas et al. (2007), Benos and Jochec 
(2007), among others. 
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for trading are exogenous. The model assumes that there is an uninformed liquidity provider who 
sets the bid and ask quotes by observing the flows of buy and sell orders and assessing the 
probability that the orders come from informed traders. The bid-ask spread compensates the 
liquidity provider for the possibility of trading with informed traders. At the beginning of each 
trading day, the arrival rate of buy (sell) orders follows the independent Poisson distribution, and 
the likelihood function of the Easley et al. (1996) model is as follows:  
𝐿(𝑎, 𝑑, 𝑢, 𝜀௕ , 𝜀௦|𝐵, 𝑆) =  (1 − 𝑎)𝑒ିఌ್
𝜀௕஻
𝐵!
𝑒ିఌೞ
𝜀௦ௌ
𝑆!
+ 𝑎𝑑𝑒ି(௨ାఌ್)
(𝑢 + 𝜀௕)஻
𝐵!
𝑒ିఌೞ
𝜀௦ௌ
𝑆!
 
                                                       +𝑎(1 − 𝑑)𝑒ିఌ್ ఌ್
ಳ
஻!
𝑒ି(௨ାఌೞ) (௨ାఌೞ)
ೄ
ௌ!
, 
(1) 
where 𝐵 (𝑆) is the number of buys (sells) for a given trading day, a is the probability of a private 
information event occurring before the day, 𝑑 and (1 − 𝑑) are the probabilities of good news and 
bad news, respectively, if the information event occurs, 𝑢 is the arrival rate of buy or sell orders 
submitted by informed traders, and 𝜀௕ (𝜀௦) is the arrival rate of buy (sell) orders submitted by the 
uninformed traders. With the structural parameters estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood 
function based on (1),9 Easley, Hvidkajaer, and O’Hara (2002) computes PIN as a fraction of 
orders that arises from informed traders relative to the overall total order flow, as follows: 
𝑃𝐼𝑁 =
𝑎𝑢
𝑎𝑢 + 𝜀௕ + 𝜀௦
 (2) 
We estimate PIN for a sample of all ordinary common stocks listed on the NYSE and 
AMEX (CRSP exchange codes 1 and 2, and share codes 10 and 11) for the years 1993–2004, 
                                                 
9 We follow Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2010) to factor out the common term 𝑒ିఌ್ିఌೞ(𝑢 + 𝜀௕)஻(𝑢 + 𝜀௦)ௌ/
(𝐵! 𝑆!) from (1), because computating the factorial and exponential of a large number of buy and sell orders will 
likely cause numerical overflows. 
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using intraday trades and quotes of stocks collected from the TAQ database. We focus on the 
NYSE and AMEX stocks because these exchanges possess the market microstructure that 
conforms most closely to the PIN structural model. We use the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm 
to classify buy-initiated trades (buys) and sell-initiated trades (sells). Trades with a price above 
the midpoint of the bid-ask spread five seconds before the trades are classified as “buys” and 
those below the midpoint as “sells”. Trades that occur at the mid-point of the bid and ask prices 
are classified as buyer- or seller-initiated according to a tick test, which classifies a trade as 
buyer-initiated (sell-initiated) if the price was above (below) that of the previous trade. If there 
are no quotes posted during the trading day, we use the tick test to sign any trades made during 
the day. Then, for each day, we aggregate the total number of buys and sells for each stock.   
While PIN is commonly adopted as a measure of information asymmetry, a small but 
growing stream of research has casted doubt on whether it even captures information risk that 
arises from information asymmetry. In particular, Duarte and Young (2009) argue that when PIN 
is decomposed into illiquidity and asymmetric information, the component related to asymmetric 
information, i.e., AdjPIN, is not priced in the cross section of stock returns. Duarte and Young 
(2009) design the AdjPIN measure to better cope with the prevalent positive contemporaneous 
correlation between buys and sells as actually observed in the data. In this study, we use AdjPIN 
as the second proxy for information asymmetry, which is computed based on Duarte and Young 
(2009), as follows: 
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑃𝐼𝑁 =
𝑎(𝑑𝑢௕ + (1 − 𝑑)𝑢௦)
𝑎(𝑑𝑢௕ + (1 − 𝑑)𝑢௦) + (𝛥௕ + 𝛥௦)(𝑎𝜃ᇱ + (1 − 𝑎)𝜃) + 𝜀௕ + 𝜀௦
, (3) 
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where the parameters in (3) are derived from Duarte and Young’s (2009) AdjPIN-model,10 𝜃 (𝜃ᇱ) 
is the probability of a symmetric order-flow shock conditional on the absence (arrival) of private 
information, 𝛥௕  (𝛥௦) is the arrival rate of buys (sells) caused by symmetric order-flow shocks, 
and 𝑢௕ (𝑢௦) is the arrival rate of buy (sell) orders submitted by informed traders if the 
information event occurs. The definitions of 𝜀௕, 𝜀௦, 𝑎, and 𝑑 are the same as in equation (1). 
The AdjPIN measure differs from PIN in several aspects. First, AdjPIN allows for the 
arrival rate of informed buyers, 𝑢௕ , to be different from the arrival rate of informed sellers, 𝜀௦ ,  
which enables the model to account for the fact that buy order flow has a greater variance than 
sell order flow for virtually all firms in the data. The more important difference is that the 
AdjPIN model allows for a new type of arrival rates of buys (sells) in the event of symmetric 
order-flow shocks, 𝛥௕ (𝛥௦). 
We follow Duarte and Young (2009) and estimate AdjPIN for each firm-year over the 
1993–2004 period by setting 𝜃 = 𝜃’. To avoid numerical overflows, we use 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜆 + 𝑋𝑙𝑛(𝜆) −
∑ 𝑖௑௜ୀଵ ) for the Poisson density function of the form 𝑒ିఒ
ఒ೉
௑!
. As with PIN, we factored out the 
common term in the joint probability density function. 
2.2.2 Institutional Ownership 
Institutional ownership (IO): This variable is defined as the sum of shares held by 
institutional investors as a fraction of the firm’s total shares outstanding measured at the end of 
each year. Following prior work (e.g., Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Yan and Zhang, 2009), we 
exclude observations with IO greater than 100%, and set IO to zero if a stock is not held by any 
institutions. A negative and significant correlation between this variable and PIN or AdjPIN will 
                                                 
10 The likelihood function of Duarte and Young’s (2009) AdjPIN model is presented in the Appendix. 
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provide support for the hypothesis that institutional investors can mitigate asymmetric 
information on a stock.  
Institutional ownership concentration (TOP5 or IOHHI): Following the standard 
approach (cite one or two papers here if possible), we use two measures to proxy for the 
concentration of institutional ownership of a firm. The first measure, TOP5, is the ratio of the 
shares owned by the five largest institutional investors to total shares outstanding. The other 
proxy is the Herfindahl index of institutional ownership (IOHHI) that is calculated as the sum of 
squares of the proportions of the firm's shares held by institutional investors. 
Change of institutional ownership (∆IO): This variable is defined as the difference in IO 
between two consecutive years. Because prior work (e.g., Sias, Starks, and Titman, 2006; Bushee 
and Goodman, 2007) suggests that changes in ownership by institutional investors may proxy for 
institutional trading associated with informed trading, we expect to find a significant and positive 
relation between this variable and the information asymmetry measures. 
2.2.3 Abnormal Stock Returns 
We closely follow prior work (e.g., Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara, 2010; Armstrong et 
al., 2011) to compute abnormal returns (alpha) by estimating the four-factor model of Carhart 
(1997). The next subsection discusses the details of how to construct a hedge portfolio and how 
its abnormal return is estimated. 
2.2.4 Other Control Variables 
To disentangle the effect of institutional ownership on information asymmetry from other 
effects, we follow prior work (e.g., Piotroski and Toulstone, 2004; Ferreira and Laux, 2007) and 
use the following control variables:   
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 Firm size (SIZE): We use the natural logarithm of market capitalization (MCAP) to proxy 
for firm size, which is calculated as share price times total shares outstanding at the end 
of each year. We use CRSP cumulative adjustment factors to correct both share price and 
shares outstanding for stock splits and dividends.  
 Firm age (LAGE): Firm age is defined as the natural logarithm of the number of years 
(AGE) since the first return appears in CRSP.  
 Market-to-book ratio (MTB): This ratio is defined as the natural logarithm of market 
value over book value of equity at the end of each year.  
 Turnover (TURN): This variable is defined as the natural logarithm of average monthly 
turnover (monthly trading volume divided by shares outstanding) for the past twelve 
months. 
 Transaction costs (SPREAD): This variable is measured by the average daily quoted 
spread over the previous calendar year. 
 Leverage (LEV): Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets at the 
end of the year. 
 Return on equity (ROE): This ratio is defined as the most recent earnings before 
extraordinary items during the year, divided by the book value of equity at the end of the 
year.  
 Volatility of return on equity (VOL): The volatility of ROE is the sample variance of 
monthly ROEs over the last three years.  
15 
 
 Dividend dummy (DD): This variable equals one if a firm pays dividends during a year 
and zero otherwise.   
 Diversification dummy (DIVER): This dummy variable equals one if a firm operates in 
multi-business segments and zero otherwise.  
 SP500: A dummy variable for membership in the S&P 500 index. 
Aside from these firm characteristics, we also include two control variables that proxy for 
private and public information in a stock, respectively. 
 Insider trading (INSIDE): Insiders transmit private information to market participants 
through their trading activity (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004; Chen, Goldstein, and 
Zhang, 2007; Sias and Whidbee, 2010). We measure insider trading as the difference 
between the number of shares purchased and the number of shares sold in a year by 
insiders, scaled by the firm’s total number of shares outstanding at the end of each year. 
We expect to find a significant and positive relationship between information asymmetry 
and insider trading.  
 Analyst coverage (ALYST): Analysts disseminate private information through their 
earnings forecasts, revisions, and stock recommendations. Easley, O’Hara, and Paperman 
(1998) find that the presence of analysts reduces the content of private information in the 
stock price. Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) document that analysts can increase the 
relative amount of market- and industry-level information in stock prices, which suggests 
that they are likely to reduce private information in stock prices. We use the log of the 
number of analysts following a firm in each year as a proxy for analyst coverage, set to 
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zero if there is no information on analyst coverage. We expect to find a negative and 
significant effect of analyst coverage on information asymmetry. 
 
2.3 Methodology 
The focus of our study is to examine how institutional ownership affects the relationship 
between information asymmetry and expected returns. Before addressing this question, we first 
examine the relationship between institutional ownership and information asymmetry by 
estimating the following regression:  
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂௜,௧ = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝐼𝑂௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛾′𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿௜,௧ିଵ + 𝑒௜,௧ , (4) 
where the dependent variable is proxied by either PIN or AdjPIN, both measured in year t, 
CONTROL is a vector of firm characteristics as discussed in Subsection 2.2.4, subscripts i and t 
index stock and year, respectively. The key variable is institutional ownership, IO.  
To examine the pricing effect of information asymmetry, we use both the portfolio 
approach and the Fama-MacBeth framework. In the portfolio approach, we follow Easley, 
Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2010) to compare the abnormal return of a portfolio of large-PIN (large-
AdjPIN) stocks with that of a portfolio of small-PIN (small-AdjPIN) stocks. We use this 
approach because of the  advantage that it frees us from the assumption of linearity in the 
variable of interest (e.g., the sort variable). Besides, this approach collapses the cross section of 
returns into a single time series of observations and thus alleviates concerns over the cross-
sectional dependence. At the end of each year, we sort sample stocks into terciles based on the 
PIN (AdjPIN) measure estimated over the year. Then for each of these portfolios, we compute 
both monthly equally weighted or value-weighted portfolio returns, with the value-weighted 
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returns calculated based on the market capitalization in the previous month. Next, we form a 
hedge portfolio by taking a long position in the large-PIN (large-AdjPIN) portfolio and a short 
position in the small-PIN (small-AdjPIN) portfolio. Finally, we estimate the abnormal return of 
the hedge portfolio by running the following four-factor regression of Carhart (1997):  
𝑅௛௘ௗ௚௘,௧ = 𝛼ூேிை + 𝛽ଵ𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐹௧ + 𝛽ଶ𝑆𝑀𝐵௧ + 𝛽ଷ𝐻𝑀𝐿௧ + 𝛽ସ𝑈𝑀𝐷௧ + 𝑒௧, (5) 
where the dependent variable is the monthly return of the hedge portfolio, MKTRF, SMB, and 
HML are the three factors of Fama and French (1993), and UMD is the momentum factor of 
Carhart (1997). Our interest is in 𝛼ூேிை , which refers to either 𝛼௉ூேor 𝛼஺ௗ௝௉ூே depending on 
whether the portfolio is sorted by PIN or AdjPIN. A positive and statistically significant 𝛼ூேிை 
suggests that a trading strategy of buying large-PIN (large-AdjPIN) stocks and selling small-PIN 
(small-AdjPIN) stocks is profitable and thus implies that investors generally require 
compensation for information risk that arises from information asymmetry.   
As an alternative to the portfolio approach, we follow Duarte and Yong (2009) to use the 
Fama and MacBeth’s (1973) regression method to examine the pricing of information 
asymmetry, as follows: 
        𝑅௜,௧ = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ଶ𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ଷ𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ସ𝐵𝑇𝑀௜,௧ିଵ + 𝑒௜,௧ , (6) 
where the dependent variable is the monthly return of stock i. INFO is measured by either PIN or 
AdjPIN. We estimate the beta, Beta, of a stock using the data of the past 60 months. SIZE is the 
natural logarithm of market capitalization, and BTM is the natural logarithm of book to market 
ratio.  
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To address the main research question of whether and under which setting information 
asymmetry as captured by PIN or AdjPIN is priced in the cross section of stock returns, we 
extend both (5) and (6) by accommodating institutional ownership in our analysis. In the 
portfolio approach, we double-sort stocks by IO and PIN (AdjPIN). Double-sorting makes it 
possible to see whether there are significant differences in the abnormal returns of the hedge 
portfolios across different IO-sorted groups. Specifically, we sort stocks into quintiles based on 
IO measure at the end of the year. The stocks in each quintile portfolio are then sorted into 
terciles according to PIN (AdjPIN) estimated over the year. Double-sorting thus produces fifteen 
IO-PIN (IO-AdjPIN) portfolios shown as follows: 
 
                   PIN (AdjPIN) 
          IO Small (A) Medium (B) Large (C) Hedge Portfolio 
 
Lowest (1) (1, A) (1, B) (1, C) (1, C) – (1, A) 
             (2) (2, A) (2, B) (2, C) (2, C) – (2, A) 
             (3) (3, A) (3, B) (3, C) (3, C) – (3, A) 
             (4) (4, A) (4, B) (4, C) (4, C) – (4, A) 
Highest (5) (5, A) (5, B) (5, C) (5, C) – (5, A) 
 
We construct five hedge portfolios by longing the large-PIN (large-AdjPIN) portfolio and 
shorting the small-PIN (small-AdjPIN) portfolio. We then compute the abnormal returns (αINFO) 
of these five hedge portfolios by estimating equation (5). Checking the statistical and economic 
significance of 𝛼ூேிை across the IO quintile groups will reveal a setting in which institutional 
ownership affects the pricing of information asymmetry. 
We also identify this setting by extending equation (6) to include interaction terms 
between information asymmetry proxy PIN (AdjPIN) and a dummy variable that indexes to 
which IO group a stock belongs. We first sort stocks into tercile group based on IO measure at 
the end of each year, and then use three dummy variables to index the IO group to which a stock 
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belongs. We interact these variables with an information asymmetry measure and estimate the 
following regression: 
𝑅௜,௧ =  𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ൫𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂௜,௧ିଵ × 𝐷𝐿൯ + 𝛽ଶ൫𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂௜,௧ିଵ × 𝐷𝑀൯  + 𝛽ଷ൫𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂௜,௧ିଵ × 𝐷𝐻൯   
                     +𝛽ସ𝐷𝑀 + 𝛽ହ𝐷𝐻 +  𝛽଺𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛽଻𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛽଼𝐵𝑇𝑀௜,௧ିଵ + 𝑒௜,௧. 
(6a) 
Our variables of interest include three interaction terms, (𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂௜,௧ିଵ × 𝐷𝐿), (𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂௜,௧ିଵ ×
𝐷𝑀), and (𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂௜,௧ିଵ × 𝐷𝐻), which capture the effects of information asymmetry on expected 
returns for firms belonging to the low-, medium- and high-IO groups, respectively.  
 
3 Empirical Results  
3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
We compute mean cross-sectional measures of information asymmetry, institutional 
ownership, and other control variables for each year over the 1993–2004 period. Panel A of 
Table 1 reports the time-series summary statistics of these twelve cross-sectional averages. The 
mean estimate of PIN is 0.22, compared to 0.18 for AdjPIN, which means that about 20% of all 
observed trades in our sample period originates from informed investors. Both the mean and 
median estimates of AdjPIN are smaller than are those of PIN, which is consistent with the 
argument in Duarte and Young (2009) that AdjPIN captures only one component of PIN. On 
average, a firm in our sample has about 48% of its total shares held by institutional investors, 
with the top five largest institutional investors holding nearly 23%. It has an average market 
capitalization of USD 267 million. The average firm age is about 12 years.  
Insert Table 1 here 
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Panel B of Table 1 presents a correlation matrix for the time-series averages of cross-
sectional correlations between the information asymmetry measures and institutional ownership, 
as well as other control variables. PIN and AdjPIN are positively correlated, with a high 
significant coefficient of 0.73. Institutional ownership is negatively correlated with both PIN and 
AdjPIN, with a correlation coefficient comparable in magnitude (-0.52 for PIN and -0.48 for 
AdjPIN), suggesting that there is possibly a relationship between institutional ownership and 
information asymmetry. With regard to control variables, analyst coverage (ALYST) is negatively 
correlated with both PIN and AdjPIN as expected, consistent with earlier work which shows that 
analyst coverage reduces the amount of private information in stock prices. Insider trading 
(INSIDE) is positively correlated with PIN and AdjPIN. Both firm size and age are negatively 
correlated with information asymmetry measures, which is intuitive because older and larger 
firms tend to be associated with a lower probability of informed trading as documented in prior 
literature. 
Table 2 shows key characteristics of the fifteen portfolios double-sorted by IO and the 
information asymmetry measures. The key characteristics include the average of PIN, AdjPIN, 
IO, MCAP, and monthly returns. Several remarks are in order. First, both PIN and AdjPIN 
decrease monotonically from the lowest- to the highest-IO stocks. Second, IO monotonically fall 
from small- to large-PIN (large-AdjPIN) stocks within each of the IO quintile groups. These 
results suggest that there may be an inverse relationship between institutional ownership and 
information asymmetry captured by PIN and AdjPIN. Firm size increases when we move from 
the lowest- to the highest-IO stocks, regardless of PIN (AdjPIN) tercile groups. Within each IO 
group, firm size decreases monotonically as we move from the small- to the large-PIN (large-
AdjPIN) stocks, consistent with the conjecture that the trading of small stocks is associated with 
21 
 
a greater probability of private information. While monthly returns apparently depend on both 
information asymmetry and IO, the difference in monthly returns between the large-PIN (large-
AdjPIN) and small-PIN (small-AdjPIN) portfolios is positive and significant only for the lowest- 
and second lowest-IO quintiles. 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
3.2 Institutional Shareholding and Information Asymmetry 
To examine the relation between institutional ownership and information asymmetry 
visually, we plot the average IO against the PIN quintile (left panel) and AdjPIN quintile (right) 
in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows that the smallest-PIN quintile (Q1) has a greater IO relative to Q2 
and this relationship is monotonic across all PIN quintiles. A qualitatively similar result is also 
documented for AdjPIN.  
Insert Figure I here 
To examine the relationship between institutional ownership and information asymmetry 
closely in a regression framework, we estimate the regression equation (4) for 16,866 firm-year 
observations over the 1994–2004 sample period and present the results in Table 3. Following 
Petersen (2009), we adjust standard errors for clustering at firm and year levels to account for 
possible residual correlations among different firms in the same year and across different years 
for the same firm. To control for possible industry and time fixed effects, we include a set of 
dummies for one-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) as well as for years in all 
regressions.   
Insert Table 3 here 
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As we can see in both panels, the IO coefficient is negative and highly significant in all 
specifications. Column 1 shows that the coefficient estimate of IO is negative and significant 
when we control for firm characteristics, analyst coverage, and insider trading. In columns 2 and 
3, we add institutional ownership concentration (TOP5 or IOHHI) and find that its coefficient 
estimates are positive and statistically significant, which is consistent with Heflin and Shaw 
(2000) and Aslan et al. (2011) that institutional ownership concentration increases the probability 
of informed trading. However, the coefficient estimates of IO remain negative and significant in 
both columns 2 and 3. In column 4, we control for transaction costs (SPREAD) and find that 
stocks with higher transaction costs are associated with a higher probability of informed trading, 
consistent with prior work (e.g., Falkenstein, 1996; Gompers and Metrick, 2001). The coefficient 
estimates of IO remain negative and significant, though. In columns 5‒6, where we control for 
both institutional ownership concentration and transaction costs simultaneously, the coefficient 
estimates of IO remain negative and statistically significant. Collectively, these results suggest 
that there exists a negative relationship between institutional ownership and PIN or AdjPIN, 
which is robust to the use of controls for institutional ownership concentration, transaction costs, 
and other firm characteristics. These results support the hypothesis that the presence of 
institutional investors through share ownership sends a (more) credible signal that proper 
monitoring is in place to ameliorate a firm’s information environment, consistent with Dennis 
and Weston (2001) and Aslan et al. (2011), who document a negative relationship between 
institutional ownership and PIN. 
With regard to other control variables, we find results that are largely consistent with the 
literature. Larger or older firms are negatively associated with PIN or AdjPIN, as are firms with 
greater stock liquidity, higher market-to-book ratios, and greater analyst coverage. Firms with 
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higher leverage or in the S&P 500 index are positively associated with information asymmetry, 
as are firms with greater insider trading activities.  
To check the robustness of our baseline results and address endogeneity concerns, we 
also use alternative estimation methods. We use the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression method to 
account for possible cross-sectional correlations between firms in a given year. In addition, we 
use the firm fixed effects regressions to control for unobserved time-invariant sources of firm 
heterogeneity. Another major concern is the reverse causality between information asymmetry 
and IO, that is, institutional investors may avoid stocks with a greater probability of private 
information in stock prices. To address the reverse causality issue, we add a one-year lag of the 
dependent variable (see Chung and Zhang, 2011) to the regressions as an explanatory variable. 
Columns 1‒3 in Table 4 present the results based on these estimation methods. The IO 
coefficient remains negative and highly significant in all specifications regardless of the use of 
proxies for information asymmetry. We also estimate a system of simultaneous equations in 
which the dependent variables are PIN/AdjPIN and IO (columns 4‒5). We add stock prices 
(PRC) and cumulative stock returns over the past twelve months (MOM) to the IO equation 
(Gompers and Mettrick, 2001). The IO coefficient remains negative and significant in this 
alternative specification (column 4), while the coefficients on lagged PIN and lagged AdjPIN in 
the IO regression (column 5) are significantly negative. These results reinforce the evidence 
reported earlier that an inverse relationship exists between IO and information asymmetry.  
Insert Table 4 here 
Overall, this subsection provides evidence that supports a negative and significant 
relationship between institutional ownership and information asymmetry, which is robust to the 
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inclusion of institutional ownership concentration, transaction costs, and other controls for firm 
characteristics, as well as to the use of different estimation methods.  
 
3.3 Are PIN and AdjPIN Priced? 
To examine the pricing effect of information asymmetry, we first run the regression 
equation (5) based on three portfolios single-sorted on the basis of PIN (AdjPIN) estimates and a 
hedge portfolio with a long position in the large-PIN (large-AdjPIN) stocks and a short position 
in the small-PIN (small-AdjPIN) stocks. Table 5 reports the coefficient estimates with robust 
standard errors. Panel A displays the estimates for equally weighted portfolios wile Panel B 
presents the estimates for value-weighted portfolios. As shown in both panels, the estimated 
abnormal return of each portfolio (𝛼௉ூே and 𝛼஺ௗ௝௉ூே) is positive and significant, increasing 
monotonically from the small-PIN (small-AdjPIN) to the large-PIN (large-AdjPIN) stocks. More 
importantly, the abnormal return of the hedge portfolio is positive and statistically significant. 
The estimates of 𝛼௉ூே  are 0.5% and 0.4% per month for equally weighted and value-weighted 
hedge portfolios, respectively, while the estimates of 𝛼஺ௗ௝௉ூே are smaller (0.4% and 0.3% per 
month, respectively). These results show that abnormal returns are earned on stocks with greater 
information asymmetry in excess of standard risk factors, implying that investors appear to 
require compensation for information risk that arises from information asymmetry. The results 
are consistent with findings in Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002, 2010) that investors do 
require compensation for information disadvantages, but in this study, we use both PIN and 
AdjPIN as proxies for information asymmetry. 
Insert Table 5 here 
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As mentioned above, 𝛼஺ௗ௝௉ூே is smaller than 𝛼௉ூே  for both equally weighted and value-
weighted hedge portfolios. Using the Fama-MacBeth regression equation (6), Duarte and Young 
(2009) argue that AdjPIN, which captures the asymmetric information component of PIN, cannot 
explain the cross-sectional differences in stock returns. We estimate the regression model (6) 
based on our sample data and report the results in Table 6. The coefficient estimate of PIN is 
positive and significant (column 1), but the coefficient on AdjPIN (column 3) is insignificant, 
which is similar to Duarte and Young’s (2009) results that information asymmetry proxied by 
AdjPIN is not priced in cross-sectional return estimations.  
Insert Table 6 here 
Overall, this subsection, on the one hand, presents evidence that supports and extends the 
findings of Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002, 2010) that both PIN and AdjPIN is priced, and 
on the other hand, documents evidence similar to Duarte and Young (2009) that shows AdjPIN is 
not priced in the cross section of stock returns. It is then natural to ask whether there is some 
fundamental economic reason behind this contradiction. We provide analysis to answer this 
question in the next subsection.  
 
3.4 When are PIN and AdjPIN Priced?  
A main purpose of this study is to identify a circumstance under which information 
asymmetry is likely to exhibit the greatest effect on expected returns, coupled with a setting 
where information asymmetry is most likely in evidence. Given the baseline results that 
institutional ownership has a negative effect on information asymmetry, together with the 
evidence that information asymmetry is positively associated with expected return, the questions 
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to ask are whether the pricing effect of information asymmetry is affected by institutional 
ownership and whether institutional ownership explains the empirical controversy that we noted 
in the preceding subsection.  
To answer these questions, we first re-estimate equation (5) but based on five hedge 
portfolios double-sorted by IO and PIN (AdjPIN) to account for different levels of institutional 
ownership. Table 7 presents the results with robust standard errors, where Panel A uses equally 
weighted portfolios while Panel B uses value-weighted portfolios. Both panels show that the 
abnormal return (𝛼௉ூே and 𝛼஺ௗ௝௉ூே) of the hedge portfolios is decreasing in IO. In particular, 
only 𝛼௉ூே and 𝛼஺ௗ௝௉ூே estimated from the regressions based on the lowest- and the second 
lowest-IO groups (columns 1 and 2) are significantly positive,  ranging from between 0.4% to 
0.9% per month. The 𝛼௉ூே and 𝛼஺ௗ௝௉ூே  estimates from  other IO groups are all statistically 
insignificant and their economic significance also is much smaller (one of them is close to zero). 
These results show that the pricing effect of information asymmetry is restricted to low-IO 
stocks, which implies that a substitution effect may operate between institutional ownership and 
information asymmetry. For instance, uninformed investors, such as retail traders, demand a 
higher expected return on stocks that contain substantial private information as compensation for 
information risk that arises from their informational disadvantages; however, this adverse effect 
is likely to be mitigated in firms by high institutional ownership. 
Insert Table 7 here 
Consolidating Tables 5 and 7 suggests that the results documented for the aggregate-IO 
hedge portfolio are driven largely by a subset of stocks, i.e., stocks with low levels of 
institutional ownership. Although the aggregate hedge portfolio yields a significant and positive 
abnormal return as shown in the last column of Table 5, Table 7 shows that this result is driven 
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by stocks with low institutional ownership levels. High-IO stocks do not contribute to abnormal 
returns in any meaningful sense. Hence, these results support the hypothesis that the pricing 
effect of information asymmetry is significant only for stocks with low levels of institutional 
ownership. 
An interesting debate is on whether PIN is priced because of asymmetric information in 
stock trading or because of stock illiquidity (e.g. Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara, 2010; Duarte 
and Young, 2009). We augment the regression equation (5) by adding the liquidity factor of 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) to see if our main results are still valid, and present the results in 
Table 8. Again, the results are qualitatively similar.  
Insert Table 8 here 
As a robustness check, we use an alternative sorting procedure with the portfolio 
approach in which stocks are sorted into terciles, rather than quintiles, based on IO, and then 
within each IO tercile, stocks are further sorted into tercile groups based on PIN (AdjPIN), 
resulting in a total of nine portfolios. A reverse sorting, i.e., stocks are sorted first by PIN 
(AdjPIN) and then by IO, is also used. None of these procedures alters the main results 
qualitatively. For brevity, we do not report these results in this paper. 
Because different approaches may lead to contradicting results as we mentioned in the 
preceding section, we use our sample data and estimate the regression equation (6a) to examine 
further the effect of institutional ownership on expected returns. If the results are consistent with 
those obtained from the portfolio approach, the coefficient estimate of (𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂 × 𝐷𝐿) should be 
positive and significant, whereas the coefficient estimate of (𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂 × 𝐷𝐻) should be 
insignificant. Columns 2 and 4 of Table 6 report the results from estimating equation (6a). As we 
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can see in column 2, the coefficient estimate of (𝑃𝐼𝑁 × 𝐷𝐿) is significant and positive, while the 
coefficient on (𝑃𝐼𝑁 × 𝐷𝐻) is insignificant. Similar results are observed for AdjPIN in column 4. 
These results reinforce our results reported earlier that information asymmetry as captured by 
PIN or AdjPIN is priced only among stocks with low levels of institutional stock ownership.  
Overall, this subsection shows that the pricing effect of information asymmetry proxied 
by PIN or AdjPIN is significant only among stocks with low institutional ownership levels. The 
effect disappears among the stocks with high levels of institutional ownership. 
 
4 Conclusions 
This paper examines the pricing effect of information asymmetry measured by the PIN of 
Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002) and the AdjPIN of Duarte and Young (2009). In the 
portfolio approach, which does not distinguish stocks by institutional ownership level, we find 
that both PIN and AdjPIN exhibit significant pricing effects in excess of standard risk factors. In 
the regression approach, in which we regress returns on the information asymmetry measure over 
all individual stocks, we find that only PIN, and not AdjPIN, is priced in the cross section of 
stock returns. When institutional ownership is considered, however, this controversial result 
disappears. Using both approaches, we find that information asymmetry as captured by PIN or 
AdjPIN affects expected returns only for stocks with low levels of institutional ownership. There 
is no such evidence for stocks with high institutional ownership levels, though.    
A natural question to ask is why the PIN and AdjPIN measures are not priced for stocks 
with high institutional ownership. Two possibilities emerge. First, empirical literature has well-
established that institutional investors act as active monitors by directly intervening in a firm's 
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activities (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Gillan and Starks, 2000; Ferreira and Mastos, 2008). This 
monitoring role can potentially mitigate information asymmetry in a stock. More importantly, 
institutional monitoring can prevent the leakage and spread of harmful private information, so 
that uninformed investors take institutional ownership in a firm as a credible signal that the 
information risk arising from information asymmetry is mitigated. Second, as a measure of 
information asymmetry, neither PIN nor AdjPIN distinguishes the types of private information in 
the trading of a stock. In a sense, while both PIN and AdjPIN measure the quantity of private 
signals, they do not take into account the effectiveness of such signals that reveal the 
fundamental value of a firm. Therefore, uninformed investors may take institutional holdings as 
an alternative signal for assessing information risk. Taken together, these two factors lead us to 
the observation that the effects of the PIN and AdjPIN measures on expected stock returns only 
materialize for such firms that have a small proportion of institutional investors. Further 
research, however, is warranted in order to determine whether these explanations are reasonably 
valid. This remains a topic for our future research. 
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Appendix: The Likelihood of the Extended PIN Model 
Duarte and Young (2009) extend the PIN model of Easley et al. (1996) to allow for the 
pervasive positive contemporaneous correlations between buyer- and seller-initiated order flows 
as actually observed in the data. They decompose PIN into two components: asymmetric 
information, which they term “adjusted” PIN (AdjPIN), and illiquidity. Thus, AdjPIN is PIN 
purged of all illiquidity effects unrelated to information asymmetry. Duarte and Young (2009) 
argue that AdjPIN is more accurate as a proxy for information asymmetry. The likelihood 
function of the AdjPIN model is specified as follows:  
𝐿(𝜗|𝐵, 𝑆) =  (1 − 𝑎)(1 − 𝜃)𝑒ିఌ್
𝜀௕஻
𝐵!
𝑒ିఌೞ
𝜀௦ௌ
𝑆!
 
+ (1 − 𝑎)𝜃𝑒ି(ఌ್ା௱್)
(𝜀௕ + 𝛥௕)஻
𝐵!
𝑒ି(ఌೞା௱ೞ)
(𝜀௦ + 𝛥௦)ௌ
𝑆!
 
+ 𝑎(1 − 𝜃′)(1 − 𝑑)𝑒ିఌ್
𝜀௕஻
𝐵!
𝑒ି(௨ೞାఌೞ)
(𝑢௦ + 𝜀௦)ௌ
𝑆!
 
+ 𝑎𝜃′(1 − 𝑑)𝑒ି(ఌ್ା௱್)
(𝜀௕ + 𝛥௕)஻
𝐵!
𝑒ି(௨ೞାఌೞା௱ೞ)
(𝑢௦ + 𝜀௦ + 𝛥௦)ௌ
𝑆!
 
+ 𝑎(1 − 𝜃′)𝑑𝑒ି(௨್ାఌ್)
(𝑢௕ + 𝜀௕)஻
𝐵!
𝑒ିఌೞ
𝜀௦ௌ
𝑆!
 
+ 𝑎𝜃𝑑𝑒ି(௨್ାఌ್ା௱್)
(𝑢௕ + 𝜀௕ + 𝛥௕)஻
𝐵!
𝑒ି(ఌೞା௱ೞ)
(𝜀௦ + 𝛥௦)ௌ
𝑆!
, 
where 𝐵 (𝑆) is the number of buys (sells) for a given day, 𝜃 (𝜃′) is the probability of a symmetric 
order-flow shock conditional on the absence (arrival) of private information, 𝛥௕  (𝛥௦) is the 
arrival rate of buys (sells) in the event of symmetric order-flow shock, 𝜀௕ (𝜀௦) is the arrival rate 
of buy (sell) orders submitted by uninformed traders, 𝑎 is the probability of an information event 
occurring during a trading day, 𝑑 is the probability of good news, (1 − 𝑑) is the probability of 
bad news, 𝑢௕ (𝑢௦) is the arrival rate of buy (sell) orders submitted by informed traders if the 
information event occurs, and 𝜗 = (𝑎, 𝑢௕ , 𝑢௦, 𝜀௕ , 𝜀௦, 𝑑, 𝜃, 𝜃′, 𝛥௕, 𝛥௦) is a vector of parameters.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics  
This table reports the summary statistics of all variables for the sample period from 1993 to 2004. Panel A 
presents the time-series mean, median, standard deviation, and 25th and 75th quartiles. Panel B reports the 
correlation matrix. All variables are defined in Subsection 2.2. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics         
Variables Mean         SD        P25           P50       P75      Obs. 
Informed Trading Measures 
PIN 0.217 0.118 0.150 0.185 0.414 16,866 
AdjPIN 0.178 0.082 0.117 0.159 0.306 16,866 
Institutional Ownership 
IO 0.481 0.264 0.258 0.514 0.695 16,866 
TOP5 0.227 0.118 0.147 0.226 0.299 16,866 
IOHHI 0.154 0.186 0.045 0.075 0.182 16,866 
ΔIO 0.066 0.076 0.017 0.043 0.088 16,866 
Firm Characteristics 
MCAP 266.541 0.019 55.841 271.061 1,175.001 16,866 
MTB 1.354 0.819 1.138 1.449 2.107 16,866 
SPREAD 0.348 0.238 0.187 0.326 0.446 16,866 
TURN 0.079 0.124 0.022 0.046 0.088 16,866 
AGE 12.383 1.130 6.209 12.420 12.526 16,866 
ROA 0.030 0.478 0.021 0.102 0.168 16,866 
VOL 0.078 0.146 0.012 0.027 0.064 16,866 
LEV 0.263 0.217 0.086 0.239 0.383 16,866 
DD 0.484 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 16,866 
DIVER 0.947 0.223 1.000 1.000 1.000 16,866 
SP500 0.213 0.409 0.000 0.000 0.000 16,866 
ALYST 4.341 3.750 1.000 5.006 20.000 16,866 
INSIDE 0.011 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.004 16,866 
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Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
PIN AdjPIN IO TOP5 IOHHI ΔIO SIZE MTB TURN AGE ROE VOL LEV DD DIVER SP500 ALYST INSIDE 
PIN 1.000 
AdjPIN 0.732 1.000 
IO -0.516 -0.483 1.000 
TOP5 -0.197 -0.157 0.579 1.000 
IOHHI 0.581 0.506 0.434 0.314 1.000 
ΔIO -0.060 -0.067 0.114 0.200 -0.127 1.000 
SIZE -0.283 -0.344 0.192 -0.079 -0.232 -0.077 1.000 
MTB -0.326 -0.316 0.145 -0.082 -0.217 -0.017 0.295 1.000 
TURN -0.381 -0.347 0.256 0.113 -0.159 0.167 0.014 0.079 1.000 
AGE -0.117 -0.136 0.161 0.029 -0.164 -0.139 0.253 -0.042 -0.077 1.000 
ROE -0.120 -0.108 0.231 0.136 -0.255 -0.010 0.127 0.025 -0.119 0.106 1.000 
VOL 0.003 -0.010 -0.187 -0.165 0.184 -0.002 0.008 0.348 0.162 -0.077 -0.356 1.000 
LEV -0.001 -0.009 0.026 0.071 0.007 0.083 -0.021 0.074 0.077 -0.054 -0.076 0.235 1.000 
DD -0.220 -0.211 0.264 0.094 -0.296 -0.104 0.264 0.052 -0.173 0.406 0.200 -0.173 -0.084 1.000 
DIVER -0.032 -0.015 0.062 0.045 -0.093 -0.010 0.052 0.000 -0.069 0.124 0.081 -0.083 0.007 0.135 1.000 
SP500 -0.370 -0.395 0.335 0.017 -0.303 -0.080 0.570 0.219 0.073 0.375 0.130 -0.037 0.001 0.380 0.091 1.000 
ALYST -0.383 -0.374 0.356 0.094 -0.356 -0.034 0.410 0.140 0.069 0.313 0.145 -0.088 0.019 0.339 0.087 0.526 1.000 
INSIDE 0.025 0.034 -0.025 -0.014 0.028 0.064 -0.060 0.039 0.060 -0.148 0.004 0.024 0.012 -0.119 -0.042 -0.101 -0.079 1.000 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Portfolios Double-Sorted by IO and PIN (AdjPIN)  
This table presents key characteristics of portfolios double-sorted by IO and PIN (AdjPIN) for the 
years from 1993 through 2004. At the end of each year, stocks are sorted into quintiles based on IO. 
Within each IO quintile, stocks are further sorted into terciles based on PIN (Panel A) or AdjPIN 
(Panel B) estimated over the year. Each panel reports the mean of PINs (AdjPINs), market 
capitalizations (in USD millions), IOs and monthly returns. 
Panel A: Portfolios Double-Sorted by IO and PIN 
PIN 
IO 
  Small Medium Large Difference 
  (A) (B) (C) (C) – (A) 
  PIN 
Lowest (1) 0.171 0.309 0.512 0.341 
(2) 0.156 0.245 0.421 0.265 
(3) 0.134 0.198 0.326 0.192 
(4) 0.123 0.175 0.265 0.142 
Highest (5) 0.115 0.163 0.241 0.126 
Monthly Returns (%) 
Lowest (1) 0.912 1.651 1.735 0.823 
(2) 0.884 0.994 1.481 0.597 
(3) 0.991 1.116 1.145 0.154 
(4) 1.156 1.275 1.278 0.122 
Highest (5) 1.227 1.054 1.244 0.017 
  MCAP (USD mil.) 
Lowest (1) 614.223 173.124 72.654 -541.569 
(2) 1,696.343 492.467 238.044 -1,458.299 
(3) 7,466.561 1,657.091 828.398 -6,638.163 
(4) 11,861.299 3,322.938 1,656.327 -10,204.972 
Highest (5) 12,971.113 4,448.534 2,302.354 -10,668.759 
  IO 
Lowest (1) 0.036 0.031 0.025 -0.011 
(2) 0.208 0.198 0.198 -0.010 
(3) 0.381 0.376 0.367 -0.014 
(4) 0.547 0.545 0.521 -0.026 
Highest (5)   0.716   0.713   0.683   -0.033 
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Panel B: Portfolios Double-Sorted by IO and AdjPIN 
AdjPIN 
IO 
  Small Medium Large Difference 
  (A) (B) (C) (C) – (A) 
 AdjPIN 
Lowest (1) 0.131 0.239 0.378 0.247 
(2) 0.123 0.208 0.334 0.211 
(3) 0.115 0.176 0.271 0.156 
(4) 0.102 0.154 0.226 0.124 
Highest (5) 0.090 0.141 0.215 0.125 
Monthly Returns (%) 
Lowest (1) 1.016 1.460 1.715 0.699 
(2) 0.867 1.219 1.456 0.589 
(3) 0.984 1.125 1.145 0.161 
(4) 1.211 1.181 1.305 0.094 
Highest (5) 1.191 1.063 1.207 0.016 
  MCAP (USD mil.) 
Lowest (1) 574.338 172.312 91.945 -482.393 
(2) 1,624.389 592.648 216.003 -1,408.386 
(3) 7,781.513 1,533.731 651.628 -7,129.885 
(4) 12,141.779 3,417.978 1,358.434 -10,783.345 
Highest (5) 13,222.687 4,334.675 2,511.212 -10,711.475 
 IO 
Lowest (1) 0.031 0.021 0.021 -0.010 
(2) 0.280 0.192 0.186 -0.094 
(3) 0.389 0.376 0.375 -0.014 
(4) 0.541 0.545 0.527 -0.014 
Highest (5)   0.706   0.697   0.676   -0.030 
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Table 3: Institutional Ownership and Informed Trading 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following regression: 
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂௜,௧ = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝐼𝑂௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛾ᇱ஼ைே்ோை௅೔,೟షభ + 𝑒௜,௧, 
where the dependent variable is either PIN or AdjPIN, both measured in year t. IO is institutional 
ownership, measured in year 𝑡 − 1. CONTROL is a vector of firm characteristics as discussed in 
Subsection 2.2. Panels A and B report the estimates of pooled OLS regressions where PIN and 
AdjPIN are used, respectively, as the dependent variables. Robust t-statistics in parentheses are based 
on standard errors clustered by firm and year. Sings *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively.  
Panel A: Probability of Informed Trading (PIN)       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IO -0.024*** -0.041*** -0.014*** -0.026*** -0.042*** -0.017*** 
(-4.07) (-5.61) (-2.61) (-4.66) (-5.76) (-3.23) 
TOP5 0.039*** 0.037*** 
(3.01) (2.76) 
IOHHI 0.108*** 0.110*** 
(7.03) (7.29) 
SPREAD 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.029*** 
(4.70) (4.66) (5.08) 
ΔIO 0.010 0.004 0.024 0.011 0.005 0.025* 
(0.61) (0.23) (1.49) (0.76) (0.35) (1.80) 
SIZE -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.028*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.028*** 
(-26.37) (-26.66) (-21.34) (-25.56) (-26.09) (-21.17) 
LAGE -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
(-1.47) (-1.33) (-0.65) (-1.06) (-0.94) (-0.22) 
MTB -0.003* -0.003 -0.004** -0.005** -0.004** -0.006*** 
(-1.67) (-1.48) (-2.17) (-2.14) (-1.97) (-2.65) 
TURN -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.030*** 
(-27.16) (-27.68) (-27.68) (-25.41) (-25.54) (-25.41) 
SP500 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.022*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.022*** 
(8.89) (9.07) (7.46) (8.67) (8.84) (7.31) 
LEV 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
(3.02) (2.76) (3.39) (3.23) (3.00) (3.62) 
ROE 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 
(3.76) (3.73) (4.26) (3.47) (3.45) (3.98) 
VOL -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.031*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.027*** 
(-3.25) (-3.26) (-3.69) (-2.65) (-2.66) (-3.07) 
DD -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.008*** 
(-2.90) (-2.87) (-2.62) (-3.15) (-3.12) (-2.88) 
DIVER 0.002 0.001 0.004 -0.000 -0.001 0.002 
(0.43) (0.35) (1.02) (-0.11) (-0.19) (0.56) 
ALYST -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
(-3.09) (-2.99) (-3.29) (-3.53) (-3.42) (-3.82) 
INSIDE 0.028* 0.030* 0.027* 0.028* 0.029* 0.026* 
(1.75) (1.73) (1.68) (1.75) (1.76) (1.71) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-square 0.561 0.562 0.573 0.564 0.565 0.577 
Obs. 16,866 16,866 16,866 16,866 16,866 16,866 
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Panel B: Adjusted Probability of Informed Trading (AdjPIN)     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IO -0.013*** -0.039*** -0.011*** -0.014*** 
-
0.040*** 
-
0.012*** 
(-3.28) (-8.46) (-2.74) (-3.57) (-8.80) (-3.03) 
TOP5 0.061*** 0.060*** 
(6.76) (6.50) 
IOHHI 0.022** 0.023** 
(1.97) (2.10) 
SPREAD 0.013** 0.013* 0.014** 
(2.03) (1.91) (2.02) 
ΔIO -0.015 -0.025* -0.012 -0.015 -0.024** -0.012 
(-1.34) (-1.94) (-1.08) (-1.43) (-2.04) (-1.15) 
SIZE -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.023*** 
-
0.022*** 
-
0.022*** 
(-24.71) (-23.92) (-26.11) (-24.47) (-23.82) (-25.88) 
LAGE -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
-
0.002*** 
-
0.002*** 
(-4.23) (-3.81) (-3.98) (-3.76) (-3.43) (-3.54) 
MTB -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 
(-1.04) (-0.63) (-1.16) (-1.38) (-0.98) (-1.52) 
TURN -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.018*** 
-
0.018*** 
-
0.018*** 
(-20.10) (-20.53) (-19.64) (-17.85) (-18.03) (-17.48) 
SP500 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 
(5.69) (6.09) (5.33) (5.98) (6.39) (5.63) 
LEV 0.001** 0.001* 0.001** 0.001** 0.001* 0.001** 
(2.32) (1.73) (2.41) (2.47) (1.89) (2.55) 
ROE 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
(4.90) (4.80) (5.04) (4.46) (4.39) (4.59) 
VOL -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.025*** 
-
0.025*** 
-
0.026*** 
(-4.53) (-4.66) (-4.50) (-4.12) (-4.21) (-4.12) 
DD -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
(-1.35) (-1.31) (-1.21) (-1.57) (-1.54) (-1.43) 
DIVER 0.008** 0.008** 0.009*** 0.007** 0.007** 0.008** 
(2.46) (2.33) (2.58) (2.33) (2.19) (2.45) 
ALYST -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
-
0.002*** 
-
0.002*** 
(-3.04) (-2.73) (-3.08) (-3.63) (-3.28) (-3.70) 
INSIDE 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.031*** 
(2.78) (3.13) (2.80) (2.81) (3.15) (2.83) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-square 0.508 0.511 0.509 0.509 0.512 0.510 
Obs. 16866 16866 16866 16866 16866 16866 
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Table 4: Institutional Ownership and Informed Trading – Robustness Tests 
This table reports the alternative regressions of PIN (AdjPIN) on institutional ownership (IO) and 
other control variables. Columns 1‒3 report the Fama-MacBeth, firm-fixed effects, and pooled OLS 
regressions, respectively. Columns 4‒5 report the results from a system of simultaneous equations in 
which the dependent variables are PIN (AdjPIN) (column 4) and IO (column 5). Robust t-statistics are 
in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Panel A: Probability of Informed Trading (PIN)           
Fama-Macbeth Fixed-Effects Pool OLS Simultaneous Equation 
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) (5) 
IO -0.025*** -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.048*** 
(-6.46) (-3.73) (-4.06) (-10.43) 
TOP5 0.117*** 0.063*** 0.075*** 0.031*** 1.224*** 
(6.73) (8.92) (6.81) (3.92) (14.12) 
SPREAD 0.054*** 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.031*** -0.054*** 
(4.42) (5.15) (3.73) (12.15) (-12.56) 
ΔIO 0.033** 0.021*** 0.011 0.003 0.136*** 
(2.51) (2.84) (0.89) (0.36) (10.91) 
SIZE -0.030*** -0.031*** -0.018*** -0.033*** 0.034*** 
(-20.09) (-22.33) (-18.02) (-59.15) (34.18) 
LAGE 0.001* -0.008*** 0.001 0.000 0.001 
(2.00) (-5.03) (1.24) (0.26) (1.58) 
MTB -0.004*** 0.004*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.002 
(-3.61) (2.85) (-4.04) (-5.53) (-1.64) 
LEV 0.002*** -0.001 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.001 
(6.24) (-1.30) (3.84) (5.48) (-1.05) 
ROE 0.006*** -0.001 0.003 0.005*** 0.001 
(3.54) (-0.45) (1.59) (3.51) (0.31) 
VOL -0.034*** -0.021*** -0.015** -0.022*** -0.038*** 
(-4.65) (-3.18) (-2.47) (-4.37) (-4.85) 
TURN -0.026*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.026*** 0.035*** 
(-31.68) (-21.45) (-19.10) (-44.76) (36.34) 
DD -0.006** -0.000 -0.003 -0.007*** -0.004* 
(-2.83) (-0.09) (-1.64) (-5.24) (-1.80) 
DIVER 0.014* -0.011*** -0.000 -0.004 -0.014*** 
(2.05) (-3.44) (-0.16) (-1.37) (-3.32) 
SP500 0.024*** 0.004 0.014*** 0.032*** -0.002 
(11.43) (0.96) (6.26) (15.94) (-0.62) 
ALYST -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.002** -0.004*** 0.003*** 
(-4.02) (-4.07) (-2.53) (-7.21) (3.76) 
INSIDE 0.041** -0.001 0.006 0.043*** 0.021 
(2.27) (-0.08) (0.50) (2.88) (0.88) 
LagPIN 0.394*** -0.155*** 
(23.61) (-13.45) 
MOM 0.049*** 
(16.47) 
LPRC 0.058*** 
(38.54) 
Industry FE Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE No Yes No No No 
R-square 0.566 0.750 0.644 0.553 0.802 
Obs.   16,866   16,866   16,866   16,665 16,665 
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Panel B: Adjusted Probability of Informed Trading (AdjPIN)       
Fama-Macbeth Fixed-Effects Pool OLS Simultaneous Equation 
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) (5) 
IO -0.040*** -0.017*** -0.033*** -0.032*** 
(-11.69) (-3.19) (-9.66) (-9.15) 
TOP5 0.059*** 0.009** 0.043*** 0.041*** 1.230*** 
(9.02) (2.36) (5.35) (6.72) (14.21) 
SPREAD 0.021** 0.002 0.010* 0.014*** -0.056*** 
(2.45) (0.91) (1.87) (7.29) (-12.97) 
ΔIO -0.018* -0.021*** -0.025** -0.025*** 0.134*** 
(-2.13) (-3.43) (-2.35) (-4.08) (10.80) 
SIZE -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.017*** -0.024*** 0.035*** 
(-24.10) (-20.52) (-23.17) (-56.60) (35.16) 
LAGE -0.001 -0.011*** -0.001* -0.001*** 0.001 
(-1.76) (-8.53) (-1.78) (-2.71) (1.13) 
MTB -0.001 0.004*** -0.002* -0.002*** -0.002* 
(-1.29) (3.36) (-1.65) (-2.64) (-1.77) 
LEV 0.001** -0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001 
(2.98) (-1.38) (2.68) (3.27) (-1.25) 
ROE 0.005*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.000 
(3.90) (0.43) (2.82) (4.90) (0.12) 
VOL -0.024*** -0.003 -0.017*** -0.024*** -0.039*** 
(-5.02) (-0.48) (-3.59) (-6.37) (-4.93) 
TURN -0.016*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.017*** 0.035*** 
(-24.75) (-17.64) (-16.95) (-37.06) (36.94) 
DD -0.002*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.002* -0.003 
(-3.13) (0.48) (-0.59) (-1.69) (-1.51) 
DIVER 0.005 -0.002 0.004 0.006*** -0.013*** 
(0.67) (-0.56) (1.28) (3.13) (-3.03) 
SP500 0.011*** 0.005 0.009*** 0.013*** -0.004 
(6.36) (1.51) (5.89) (8.52) (-1.29) 
ALYST -0.002*** -0.000 -0.001** -0.002*** 0.004*** 
(-5.51) (-0.33) (-2.49) (-4.23) (4.24) 
INSIDE 0.041*** 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.043*** 0.015 
(3.99) (2.76) (3.36) (3.80) (0.65) 
LagAdjPIN 0.278*** -0.188*** 
(18.14) (-12.26) 
MOM 0.048*** 
(16.03) 
LPRC 0.058*** 
(38.55) 
Industry FE Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE No Yes No No No 
R square 0.509 0.672 0.551 0.516 0.802 
Obs.   16866   16866   16866   16665 16665 
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Table 5: Information-Hedge Portfolios and Abnormal Stock Returns 
This table reports the regression results of Carhart’s (1997) 4-factor model, 
𝑅௛௘ௗ௚௘,௧ = 𝛼ூேிை + 𝛽ଵ𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐹௧ + 𝛽ଶ𝑆𝑀𝐵௧ + 𝛽ଷ𝐻𝑀𝐿௧ + 𝛽ସ𝑈𝑀𝐷௧ + 𝑒௧, 
where the dependent variables are the monthly returns of the three tercile portfolios sorted by PIN 
(AdjPIN) and of a hedge portfolio with a long position in the large-PIN (large-AdjPIN) stocks and a 
short position in the small-PIN (small-AdjPIN) stocks. The intercept 𝛼௉ூே (𝛼஺ௗ௝௉ூே) is the abnormal 
return, MKTRF, SMB, and HML are the three factors of Fama and French (1993), and UMD is the 
momentum factor of Carhart (1997). Panel A presents the results for the equally weighted portfolios. 
Panel B reports the results for the value-weighted portfolios. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Signs *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Equally Weighted Portfolios 
 Portfolios Sorted by PIN (AdjPIN)   
 Small Medium Large Hedge Portfolio 
 (A) (B) (C) (C) – (A) 
𝛼௉ூே  0.003*** 0.004*** 0.009*** 0.005*** 
 (3.62) (2.74) (3.69) (2.93) 
MKTRF 1.028*** 1.001*** 0.763*** -0.265*** 
 (32.39) (21.85) (12.20) (-4.12) 
SMB 0.237*** 0.639*** 0.722*** 0.485*** 
 (5.83) (11.09) (10.77) (7.43) 
HML 0.627*** 0.6069*** 0.470*** -0.157*** 
 (14.43) (11.92) (5.86) (-1.67) 
UMD -0.191*** -0.210*** -0.203*** -0.013 
 (-9.67) (-4.34) (-2.50) (-0.15) 
R2 0.937 0.921 0.803 0.511 
Obs. 144 144 144 144 
𝛼஺ௗ௝௉ூே 0.004*** 0.003** 0.008*** 0.004** 
 (4.89) (2.01) (4.13) (2.05) 
MKTRF 1.019*** 1.000*** 0.770*** -0.249*** 
 (32.48) (21.21) (13.23) (-4.57) 
SMB 0.258*** 0.649*** 0.693*** 0.435*** 
 (6.29) (11.33) (10.87) (7.85) 
HML 0.565*** 0.649*** 0.494*** -0.070 
 (13.46) (12.40) (6.74) (-0.86) 
UMD -0.185*** -0.221*** -0.199*** -0.014 
 (-8.86) (-3.95) (-3.20) (-0.25) 
R2 0.937 0.912 0.817 0.487 
Obs. 144 144 144 144 
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Panel B: Value-Weighted Portfolios 
 Portfolios Sorted by PIN (AdjPIN)  
 Small Medium Large Hedge Portfolio 
 (A) (B) (C) (C) – (A) 
𝛼௉ூே  0.004*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.004** 
 (3.72) (2.95) (3.88) (2.13) 
MKTRF 1.026*** 1.010*** 0.785*** -0.240*** 
 (32.91) (23.23) (14.27) (-4.19) 
SMB 0.194*** 0.601*** 0.688*** 0.493*** 
 (5.04) (10.85) (11.56) (8.49) 
HML 0.620*** 0.626*** 0.487*** -0.133 
 (14.49) (12.86) (6.99) (-1.57) 
UMD -0.172*** -0.177*** -0.166** 0.006 
 (-8.72) (-4.49) (-2.45) (0.08) 
R2 0.932 0.917 0.838 0.555 
Obs. 144 144 144 144 
𝛼஺ௗ௝௉ூே 0.004*** 0.003** 0.008*** 0.003** 
 (4.75) (2.20) (4.37) (1.98) 
MKTRF 1.024*** 1.008*** 0.789*** -0.236*** 
 (34.26) (22.66) (15.18) (-4.68) 
SMB 0.209*** 0.608*** 0.660*** 0.451*** 
 (5.48) (11.24) (11.27) (8.69) 
HML 0.569*** 0.665*** 0.512*** -0.056 
 (13.87) (13.67) (8.01) (-0.76) 
UMD -0.163*** -0.190*** -0.162*** 0.001 
 (-9.05) (-4.26) (-3.07) (0.02) 
R2 0.939 0.914 0.847 0.545 
Obs. 144 144 144 144 
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Table 6: Information Asymmetry, Institutional Ownership, and Expected Stock 
Returns – The Fama-MacBeth Approach 
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression 
models:  
𝑅௜,௧ = 𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ଶ𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ଷ𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛽ସ𝐵𝑇𝑀௜,௧ିଵ + 𝑒௜,௧ , 
          𝑅௜,௧ =  𝛽଴ + 𝛽ଵ൫𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂௜,௧ିଵ × 𝐷𝐿൯ + 𝛽ଶ൫𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂௜,௧ିଵ × 𝐷𝑀൯  + 𝛽ଷ൫𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑂௜,௧ିଵ × 𝐷𝐻൯   
              +𝛽ସ𝐷𝑀 + 𝛽ହ𝐷𝐻 +  𝛽଺𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛽଻𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸௜,௧ିଵ + 𝛽଼𝐵𝑇𝑀௜,௧ିଵ + 𝑒௜,௧, 
where the dependent variable is the monthly return of stock i in excess of a risk-free market return, 
measured in month t. INFO is measured by either PIN or AdjPIN, Beta is the stock beta estimated 
based on the data of the past 60 months, SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalization, and 
BMT is the natural logarithm of book-to-market ratio. The three dummies, DL, DM, and DL, denote, 
respectively, whether the stock belongs to the low-, medium- or high-IO group. Columns 1 and 3 
report the results of the first model. Columns 2 and 4 show the results of the second model. Robust t-
statistics are in parentheses. Signs *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
    PIN PIN AdjPIN AdjPIN 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
INFO 0.009** 0.007 
(1.98) (1.44) 
INFO × DL 0.020*** 0.024*** 
(4.03) (4.71) 
INFO × DM 0.008 0.010 
(1.02) (1.11) 
INFO × DH 0.009 0.007 
(1.53) (0.52) 
DM 0.013*** 0.011*** 
(6.14) (4.17) 
DH 0.013*** 0.010*** 
(5.79) (3.50) 
SPREAD 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 
(6.77) (6.31) (7.08) (6.78) 
SIZE 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001 
(4.74) (3.14) (2.15) (1.61) 
BETA -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
(-0.10) (-0.51) (-0.09) (-0.68) 
BTM 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 
(6.04) (7.37) (6.00) (7.35) 
Intercept 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.005 
(0.24) (0.18) (0.55) (0.81) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of. Months 144 144 144 144 
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Table 7: Information Asymmetry, Institutional Ownership, and Abnormal Stock 
Returns – The 4-Factor Model  
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following 4-factor regression: 
𝑅௛௘ௗ௚௘,௧ = 𝛼ூேிை + 𝛽ଵ𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐹௧ + 𝛽ଶ𝑆𝑀𝐵௧ + 𝛽ଷ𝐻𝑀𝐿௧ + 𝛽ସ𝑈𝑀𝐷௧ + 𝑒௧, 
where the dependent variable is the monthly return of the hedge portfolio formed by taking a long 
position in the large-PIN (large-AdjPIN) stocks and a short position in the small-PIN (small-AdjPIN) 
stocks. The intercept 𝛼௉ூே (𝛼஺ௗ௝௉ூே)  is the abnormal return of the portfolio, MKTRF, SMB, and HML 
are the three factors of Fama and French (1993), and UMD is the momentum factor of Carhart (1997). 
Panel A reports the results for the equally weighted portfolios. Panel B displays the results for the 
value-weighted portfolios. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Signs *, **, *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Equally Weighted Portfolios 
 Hedge Portfolios Sorted by IO 
 Lowest (1) (2) (3) (4) Highest (5) 
𝛼௉ூே  0.009*** 0.006*** 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (5.11) (2.64) (1.43) (1.23) (1.47) 
MKTRF -0.220*** -0.191** -0.101** -0.094** -0.062* 
 (-3.94) (-2.48) (-2.21) (-2.39) (-1.91) 
SMB -0.050 0.126* 0.485*** 0.447*** 0.366*** 
 (-0.73) (1.75) (8.14) (7.42) (7.61) 
HML 0.027 0.101 0.058 0.157*** 0.036 
 (0.38) (0.98) (0.75) (2.93) (0.80) 
UMD -0.023 0.093* 0.037 0.044 0.085*** 
 (-0.67) (1.68) (0.93) (1.12) (2.79) 
R2 0.214 0.208 0.551 0.534 0.558 
Obs. 144 144 144 144 144 
𝛼஺ௗ௝௉ூே 0.007*** 0.004** 0.002* 0.001 0.000 
 (3.21) (2.03) (1.64) (0.19) (0.35) 
MKTRF -0.159*** -0.108* -0.084 -0.103** -0.121*** 
 (-2.97) (-1.67) (-1.77) (-2.38) (-3.55) 
SMB -0.049 0.111** 0.457*** 0.504*** 0.394*** 
 (-0.75) (2.22) (9.08) (8.89) (7.83) 
HML -0.002 -0.002 0.082 0.194*** 0.098** 
 (-0.03) (-0.03) (1.20) (3.87) (2.15) 
UMD -0.002 0.029 0.045 0.030 0.060** 
 (-0.05) (0.90) (1.42) (0.69) (2.02) 
R2 0.124 0.091 0.550 0.588 0.589 
Obs. 144 144 144 144 144 
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Panel B: Value-Weighted Portfolios 
 Hedge Portfolios Sorted by IO 
 Lowest (1) (2) (3) (4) Highest (5) 
𝛼௉ூே  0.008*** 0.005*** 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (4.83) (2.71) (1.23) (1.02) (0.29) 
MKTRF -0.230*** -0.180** -0.085* -0.086** -0.054* 
 (-4.41) (-2.44) (-1.90) (-2.28) (-1.65) 
SMB -0.052 0.154** 0.501*** 0.452*** 0.364*** 
 (-0.78) (2.19) (8.49) (7.60) (7.74) 
HML 0.006 0.068 0.061 0.161*** 0.028* 
 (0.09) (0.66) (0.81) (3.08) (1.64) 
UMD -0.023 0.081* 0.041 0.043 0.089*** 
 (-0.71) (1.70) (1.09) (1.18) (2.93) 
R2 0.217 0.194 0.578 0.539 0.574 
Obs. 144 144 144 144 144 
𝛼஺ௗ௝௉ூே 0.006*** 0.004* 0.002 0.001 0.000 
 (3.15) (1.93) (0.34) (0.08) (0.49) 
MKTRF -0.175*** -0.104 -0.079* -0.096** -0.112*** 
 (-3.26) (-1.60) (-1.71) (-2.30) (-3.37) 
SMB -0.045 0.136*** 0.477*** 0.509*** 0.385*** 
 (-0.68) (2.61) (9.59) (9.03) (7.69) 
HML -0.020 0.001 0.084 0.197*** 0.096** 
 (-0.27) (0.01) (1.30) (4.01) (2.17) 
UMD -0.007 0.037 0.047 0.032 0.062** 
 (-0.17) (1.14) (1.55) (0.77) (2.12) 
R2 0.134 0.108 0.591 0.604 0.594 
Obs. 144 144 144 144 144 
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Table 8: Information Asymmetry, Institutional Ownership, and Abnormal Stock 
Returns – The 5-Factor Model  
This table reports the coefficient estimates from the following 5-factor model: 
𝑅௛௘ௗ௚௘,௧ = 𝛼ூேிை + 𝛽ଵ𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑅𝐹௧ + 𝛽ଶ𝑆𝑀𝐵௧ + 𝛽ଷ𝐻𝑀𝐿௧ + 𝛽ସ𝑈𝑀𝐷௧ +  𝛽ହ𝑃𝑆𝐿𝐼𝑄௧ + 𝑒௧, 
where the dependent variables are the monthly returns of the hedge portfolios formed by taking a long 
position in the large-PIN (large-AdjPIN) stocks and a short position in the small-PIN (small-AdjPIN) 
stocks. The intercept 𝛼௉ூே (𝛼஺ௗ௝௉ூே) is the abnormal return of the hedge portfolios, MKTRF, SMB, 
and HML are the three factors of Fama and French (1993), UMD is the momentum factor of Cahart 
(1997), and PSLIQ is the liquidity factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). Panel A reports the results 
for the equally weighted portfolios. Panel B provides the results for the value-weighted portfolios. 
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Signs *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Equally Weighted Portfolios 
 Hedge Portfolios Sorted by IO 
 Lowest (1)       (2)         (3)        (4) Highest (5) 
𝛼௉ூே  0.008*** 0.006*** 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (4.80) (2.96) (0.24) (0.02) (0.37) 
MKTRF -0.247*** -0.165** -0.086* -0.076* -0.057* 
 (-4.38) (-2.04) (-1.81) (-1.81) (-1.70) 
SMB -0.064 0.139* 0.492*** 0.456*** 0.369*** 
 (-0.97) (1.92) (8.21) (7.61) (7.68) 
HML -0.005 0.130 0.075 0.177*** 0.042 
 (-0.06) (1.21) (0.94) (3.18) (0.91) 
UMD -0.018 0.089* 0.034 0.041 0.084*** 
 (-0.52) (1.68) (0.84) (1.01) (2.73) 
PSLIQ 0.104** -0.098 -0.057 -0.068* -0.021 
 (2.17) (-1.63) (-1.19) (-1.84) (-0.59) 
R2 0.241 0.217 0.563 0.541 0.564 
Obs. 144 144 144 144 144 
𝛼஺ௗ௝௉ூே 0.006*** 0.004** 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (3.18) (2.10) (0.57) (0.09) (0.60) 
MKTRF -0.168*** -0.100 -0.079 -0.081 -0.105** 
 (-2.93) (-1.48) (-1.59) (-1.77) (-3.10) 
SMB -0.053 0.114** 0.460*** 0.514*** 0.402*** 
 (-0.81) (2.30) (9.01) (9.32) (8.16) 
HML -0.012 0.006 0.088 0.218*** 0.116** 
 (-0.16) (0.08) (1.23) (4.12) (2.42) 
UMD -0.001 0.027 0.044 0.027 0.057* 
 (-0.02) (0.86) (1.38) (0.58) (1.92) 
PSLIQ 0.034 -0.027 -0.019 -0.080** -0.059** 
 (0.69) (-0.54) (-0.47) (-2.44) (-2.06) 
R2 0.124 0.089 0.551 0.604 0.598 
Obs. 144 144 144 144 144 
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Panel B: Value-Weighted Portfolios 
 Hedge Portfolios Sorted by IO 
 Lowest (1) (2) (3) (4) Highest (5) 
𝛼௉ூே  0.007*** 0.005*** 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (4.52) (2.97) (1.03) (0.29) (0.21) 
MKTRF -0.256*** -0.158** -0.070 -0.067* -0.049 
 (-4.79) (-2.04) (-1.50) (-1.67) (-1.48) 
SMB -0.065 0.165** 0.509*** 0.461*** 0.366*** 
 (-1.00) (2.33) (8.57) (7.80) (7.80) 
HML -0.023 0.093 0.078 0.183*** 0.033 
 (-0.34) (0.87) (1.00) (3.37) (0.73) 
UMD -0.019 0.078* 0.039 0.040 0.088*** 
 (-0.57) (1.68) (1.00) (1.05) (2.87) 
PSLIQ 0.096** -0.084 -0.057 -0.072* -0.017 
 (2.05) (-1.45) (-1.21) (-1.93) (-0.48) 
R2 0.241 0.204 0.587 0.551 0.574 
Obs. 144 144 144 144 144 
𝛼஺ௗ௝௉ூே 0.006** 0.004** 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (3.12) (2.01) (1.26) (0.39) (0.76) 
MKTRF -0.184** -0.095 -0.073 -0.073* -0.095*** 
 (-3.21) (-1.39) (-1.51) (-1.65) (-2.89) 
SMB -0.050 0.140*** 0.480*** 0.521*** 0.394*** 
 (-0.74) (2.70) (9.55) (9.52) (8.09) 
HML -0.029 0.011 0.090 0.224*** 0.115** 
 (-0.38) (0.14) (1.34) (4.34) (2.50) 
UMD -0.006 0.036 0.046 0.028 0.059** 
 (-0.13) (1.10) (1.49) (0.64) (2.01) 
PSLIQ 0.033 -0.033 -0.022 -0.087*** -0.063** 
 (0.66) (-0.66) (-0.56) (-2.67) (-2.23) 
R2 0.133 0.114 0.587 0.617 0.603 
Obs. 144 144 144 144 144 
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Figure 1: Institutional Ownership and Informed Trading 
This figure plots the mean IO by PIN (left panel) and AdjPIN (right panel) quintile using 
yearly sample data for the period from 1993 to 2004. 
 
 
 
